Counseling:
An Interpersonal Influence Process

STANLEY R. STRONG
University of Minnesota

Certain results from opinion-change research seem relevant to counseling since both areas emphasize communication and behavior change. These two areas are examined within a cognitive dissonance framework, and opinion-change research results are reviewed to show that opinion change is controlled by (a) communication discrepancy, (b) perception of communicator expertness, (c) perception of communicator trustworthiness, (d) perception of communicator attractiveness, and (e) involvement. A 2-phase model of counseling is entailed by these considerations in which the counselor manipulates these perceptual and involvement factors in the 1st phase and, in the 2nd phase, makes full use of his resulting power by actively pursuing client change so as to achieve client goals.

Goldstein and his associates have argued that extrapolation of certain principles and research findings in social psychology to counseling psychology can increase our understanding of counseling and our effectiveness as counselor (Goldstein, 1966; Goldstein & Dean, 1966; Goldstein, Heller, & Sechrest, 1966). Research on opinion change seems particularly promising for this purpose because of the focus on communication. In opinion-change research, a communicator attempts to influence his audience in a predetermined direction; in counseling, the counselor attempts to influence his client to attain the goals of counseling. Verbal communication is the main technique used by an opinion changer in influencing his audience; verbal communication is also the counselor's main means of influencing his client. For both, these communications present opinions or conceptions different than or discrepant from the opinions or conceptions of the audience or client. Finally, characteristics of the communicator as perceived by the audience, characteristics of the audience, and characteristics of the communication affect the success of influence attempts. These characteristics have been given much attention in both fields.

The purposes of this paper are to (a) review the opinion-change research on communicator and audience variables which affect the success of influence attempts, (b) suggest aspects of counseling which have similar effects, and (c) present a two-phase model of counseling based on these considerations.

OPINION-CHANGE VARIABLES: THEORIES AND RESEARCH

Festinger's (1957) cognitive dissonance theory has been the basis of much of the opinion-change research and is used to organize this review. Zimbardo (1960) has summarized the theory as follows:

Dissonance theory assumes a basic tendency toward consistency of cognitions about oneself and about the environment. When two or more cognitive elements are psychologically inconsistent, dissonance is created. Dissonance is defined as a psychological tension having drive characteristics. Thus, the existence of dissonance is accompanied by psychological discomfort and when dissonance arises, attempts are made to reduce it [p. 86].

Applied to opinion-change research, the theory suggests that an individual will experience dissonance when he knows another person—a communicator—holds an opinion contrary to his own (Festinger, 1957, p. 178). The magnitude of dissonance created by the contrary opinion is a function of the degree of perceived discrepancy between the two opinions—the greater the
perceived discrepancy, the greater the dissonance.

Five means of reducing dissonance can be drawn from the theory: (a) The individual can change his opinion to that of the communicator; (b) he can discredit the communicator and thus reduce the importance or cognitive weight of the communicator's assertions; (c) he can devaluate the importance of the issue which reduces the cognitive weights of both positions, and thus the absolute amount of dissonance created by their incompatibility; (d) he can attempt to change the communicator's opinion and, if successful, eliminate the discrepancy; and (e) he can seek to add cognitions consonant with his opinion and thus reduce the relative cognitive weight of the communication.

The avenue of dissonance reduction used by the recipient of a discrepant communication depends on the circumstances of the influence attempt. If the communicator cannot be discredited, if issue importance cannot be devaluated, if counterpersuasion cannot be exerted, and if social support cannot be found, the recipient's cognitive change is a direct function of the cognitive change advocated by the communicator. However, cognitive change is unlikely when alternative means of dissonance reduction are available. An individual's cognitions are interrelated so that a change of one cognition necessitates changes of other cognitions. The resulting psychological effort increases resistance to changing any singular cognitive element (Festinger, 1957, p. 27).

The avenues of dissonance reduction are reciprocal; an easily discredited communicator will achieve little opinion change and much derogation, while a highly credible communicator may achieve much opinion change with little derogation. Clients uninvolved in the topic of an interpretation will disclaim the importance of the issue with little cognitive change, while those highly involved may show much change with little devaluation of the topic.

The thrust of the theory is that arousal of client cognitive dissonance is a function of the psychological discrepancy between his cognitive constructs and the content of counselor communications. The client will change his cognitive constructs in the direction advocated by the counselor only if other means of dissonance reduction are controlled. The studies reviewed below deal with communicator and audience variables that control or moderate the use of one or another avenue of dissonance reduction.

Communicator characteristics which control communicator derogation are the communicator's perceived credibility and his perceived attractiveness. According to Hovland, Janis, and Kelley (1953, p. 21), communicator credibility has two components: "... (1) The extent to which a communicator is perceived to be a source of valid assertions (his 'expertness') and (2) the degree of confidence in the communicator's interest to communicate the assertions he considers most valid (his 'trustworthiness')." A communicator's attractiveness is based on his perceived similarity to, compatibility with, and liking for the influence recipient.

The communication recipient's involvement in the influence situation is a result of the intrinsic value of the issue, the effort required of him, or the personal importance of his response. Involvement controls recipient devaluation of issue importance. None of the opinion-change studies deal with dissonance reduction by securing social support or by counterpersuasion. These avenues are usually blocked by not allowing communication recipients to talk to the communicator or to each other.

**Expertness**

Perception of a communicator as a source of valid assertions is influenced by (a) objective evidence of specialized training such as diplomas, certificates, and titles, (b) behavioral evidence of expertness such as rational and knowledgeable arguments and confidence in presentation, and (c) reputation as an expert.

Aronson, Turner, and Carlsmith (1963) studied the effects of reputation as an expert on opinion change. They asked coeds to rank nine stanzas from modern poems by the way the poet used form to aid in expressing his meaning. The coeds then
read a passage describing uses and abuses of form in which the nine stanzas were examples. For each coed, stanza evaluation in the passage was set at small, moderate, or large discrepancy from her rankings. For half of the coeds, the passage was attributed to T. S. Eliot; for the other half, the passage was attributed to a student from a small teachers college. After reading the passage, the coeds reevaluated (re-ranked) the stanzas and, to measure derogation, indicated their strength of agreement with statements about the author. Results indicated the operation of communicator credibility in controlling the means of dissonance reduction in that opinion change was a linear function of discrepancy for the expert source—the greater the discrepancy, the greater the change—while it was a curvilinear function of discrepancy for the mildly credible source—opinion change increased from small to moderate discrepancy and decreased from moderate to large discrepancy. Derogation of the mildly credible source was high, while derogation of the highly credible source was low. However, derogation did not increase with discrepancy, but was constant across the discrepancy continuum.

Bockner and Insko (1966), Bergin (1962), and Browning (1966) reported similar results using objective evidence of expertness. Bockner and Insko asked undergraduates to read an article on the number of hours of sleep required by students. For half of the students, the article was attributed to “Sir John Eccles, Nobel prize winning physiologist.” For the other half, it was attributed to “Mr. Harry J. Olsen, director of the Fort Worth Y.M.C.A.” Amount of sleep advocated in the communications was varied from 8 to 0 hours. As before, opinion change was a linear function of discrepancy for the highly credible source, while it was a curvilinear function of discrepancy for the mildly credible source. In addition, disparagement of the mildly credible source was a linear function of discrepancy, but was not for the highly credible source.

Bergin (1962) studied source-expertness effects on an issue more relevant to counseling—self-ratings of masculinity-femininity. Sixty introductory psychology students rated themselves on a masculinity-femininity scale before and after treatment. They were randomly assigned to high- or low-credibility conditions and to low-, moderate-, or high-communication-discrepancy conditions. In the high-credibility condition, each student reported to a receptionist who directed him to an office decorated with diplomas, certificates, and a picture of Freud. The communicator, dressed in a white coat, tested him with complex instruments allegedly yielding an extremely accurate picture of his personality. After the tests, the communicator showed the student his ratings on masculinity-femininity and other scales. In the low-credibility condition, each undergraduate was rated by a high school student who obviously knew little about personality evaluation. Changes between pre and post self-ratings were a linear function of discrepancy in the high-credibility condition, but not in the low-credibility condition. Intensity of communicator disparagement was a function of discrepancy in the low-credibility condition, but not in the high-credibility condition.

Browning (1966) studied the effects of therapist perceived expertness (prestige) on client acceptance of interpretations in therapy. Twenty-four college-student volunteers, judged nonpsychiatric, were randomly assigned to either “high or low prestige therapists.” The same therapist served in both conditions. After an initial interview devoted to orientation to therapy, each client received 24 interpretations spaced over from two to four interviews. A significantly greater number of large discrepancy interpretations were accepted by clients in the high-prestige-therapist condition than in the low-prestige condition.

Few investigators have developed perceived expertness behaviorally, that is, with communicator rational and knowledgeable arguments and confidence. Bergin’s “expert” made some use of this source by his confidence and his impressive instruments. Brehm and Lipsher (1959) studied the effects of supporting reasons for discrepant opinions with high school students. One
hundred and fourteen students gave their opinions on a number of current social and political issues. Three weeks later they were asked to evaluate and react to the opinions of "students from another class." Half of the communications included supporting reasons for discrepant opinions, half did not. Degree of opinion discrepancy was varied. Students receiving supporting reasons for discrepant opinions rated the communicators more "trustworthy" than those not receiving supporting reasons. This may mean that, when supporting reasons were given, students perceived the opinions to be more valid, and thus viewed the communicator as more expert. Opinion-change data were inconsistent, but communications with supporting arguments tended to result in greater opinion change than those without such support.

These studies show that a communicator's perceived expertness controls the extent to which his discrepant communications will lead to opinion change rather than to his own disparagement. They also show that the greater the communicator's perceived expertness, the more discrepant his communications can be without generating derogation.

Trustworthiness

A communicator's perceived trustworthiness is a function of (a) his reputation for honesty, (b) his social role, such as physician, (c) his sincerity and openness, and (d) his perceived lack of motivation for personal gain. All of these attributes have been used to manipulate perceived trustworthiness.

Hovland and Weiss (1951) asked undergraduates to read an article on one of four issues: antihistamine drugs, atomic submarines, the steel shortage, or the future of movie theaters. One-half of the communications on each issue were attributed to a highly trustworthy source such as the New England Journal of Biology and Medicine, Robert J. Oppenheimer, etc. The other half were attributed to a less trustworthy source, such as a "pulp" pictorial magazine, Pravda, etc. Students rated presentations and conclusions more fair and justified and more of them changed their opinions in the advocated direction when articles were attributed to high-trustworthy sources than when they were attributed to low-trustworthy sources. Although opinion-change differences due to source trustworthiness were not significant on retest 4 weeks later, further research showed that when the source was reinstated at retest significant differences were retained (Kelman & Hovland, 1953).

Hovland and Mandell (1952) studied source-trustworthiness effects on opinions of the need to devaluate United States currency. The high-trustworthy communicator was an economist from a leading university; the low-trustworthy communicator was an import executive. College-undergraduate subjects were informed that importers would gain from currency devaluation. The high-trustworthy communicator was judged to do a better job and to be more fair and honest in his presentation than the low-trustworthy communicator, but opinion-change differences were not significant.

Zagona and Harter (1966) studied source-trustworthiness effects on attitudes about smoking. Three communication sources were the Surgeon General's Report on Smoking and Health, Life, and an advertisement by the American Tobacco Company. They summarized their results as follows: "...as credibility of the source increased, the percentage of subjects who agreed with the information and perceived it as trustworthy also increased [p. 155]."

Two studies suggest that trustworthiness is more important than expertness in facilitating opinion change. Kelman and Hovland (1953) played a recording of an "educational radio program" on juvenile delinquency to senior high school students. The students were asked to "judge its educational value." In the course of the program, a guest speaker was introduced who urged extreme leniency in the treatment of juvenile delinquents. In the high-trustworthy condition, the speaker was introduced as an experienced, well-informed, highly trained, sincere, and honest judge in a juvenile court. In the neutral trustworthy condition, the guest speaker was introduced as a "member of the studio audience.
chosen at random.” In the third condition, the guest speaker was also a “member of the studio audience chosen at random.” However, the introductory interview revealed that he had been a delinquent as a youth and was currently out of jail on bail for a charge of dope peddling. Each speaker presented identical content. A significantly greater proportion of the positive communicator’s audience judged the presentation to be fair and changed their opinions in the advocated direction than did the negative communicator’s audience. Proportions of the audience judging the neutral communicator to be fair and changing their opinions in the direction he advocated were only slightly less than for the positive communicator. This suggests that although the neutral communicator had no “expert” credentials he was perceived as sincere and honest and thus was as influential as the expert.

Walster, Aronson, and Abrahams (1966) presented seventh graders with “news stories” in which a public prosecutor or a convict urged stronger or weaker court power. The students were told that prosecutors would obtain more convictions with stronger court power which would enhance their personal prestige and income. Obviously, criminals would benefit personally from weaker court power. The prosecutor obtained greater opinion change than the convict when they both argued for weaker court power. However, the opposite was true in the arguments for stronger court powers. Apparently the convict’s appeal, clearly against his best interest, resulted in greater trust and perceived sincerity and thus greater opinion change. The prosecutor, arguing for a change from which he would personally benefit, was perceived to be less trustworthy and sincere and obtained less opinion change in spite of his greater prestige.

These studies show that a communicator’s perceived trustworthiness affects the extent to which he is able to effect opinion change. Results from Kelman and Hovland, and Walster et al, suggest that trustworthiness is more important than perceived expertness. Perceived untrustworthiness can obviate the influence of expertness.

Attractiveness

Communicator attractiveness is usually manipulated by assuring subjects that they will like the communicator, that they are compatible with him, or that the communicator is similar to them in background, opinions, etc. Assurances of liking, compatibility, or similarity are usually “based” on personality or opinion questionnaire results.”

A series of studies by Byrne and his associates (Byrne, 1961; Byrne & Blaylock, 1963; Byrne, Griffitt, & Golightly, 1966) has shown that opinion similarity increases perceived liking as well as perceived intelligence, adjustment, morality, and knowledgableness of the similar party. They have also shown that liking is associated with greater perceived similarity than is actually the case (Byrne & Blaylock, 1963), and that perceived similarity of opinions on important issues produces more liking than perceived similarity on unimportant issues (Byrne, 1961).

An early study of the effects of liking on interpersonal influence was done by Back (1951). He randomly paired introductory psychology students, but informed them that they were matched extraordinarily well (high attraction) or not exactly, but reasonably well (low attraction), according to the results of previous self- and “preferred other” descriptions. Each pair was brought together to discuss stories they had written in private, based on what they thought were the same photographs. Actually, the photographs were slightly different to insure different interpretational details. After their discussion, they returned to their separate rooms to “write what you now think to be the best story.” Back found that students in the high-attraction pairs attempted to influence each other more often and revised their stories more than did students in the low-attraction pairs. Sapolsky (1960) reported the same effects in verbal conditioning. Subjects told that they were well matched with the experimenter according to questionnaire results responded more to rein-
forcement than those led to believe they were less well matched.

Brock (1965) studied the effects of perceived similarity on interpersonal influence in the paint department of a large department store. After a customer selected the paint he wanted, the clerk urged him to purchase a different brand and grade of paint. The clerk began his influence attempt with a description of his recent experience with the paints on a similar size job (similar condition) or on a much larger job (dissimilar "expert" condition). The clerks were significantly more successful in influencing customers' buying decisions when they were perceived as similar than as dissimilar but expert. Burnstein, Stotland, and Zander (1961) have demonstrated that perceived similarity in background facilitates interpersonal influence. Berscheid (1966) has shown that perceived similarity based on opinions relevant to the topic of influence facilitates interpersonal influence more than perceived similarity based on opinions irrelevant to the influence topic.

These studies show that the influence recipient's liking for the communicator, his perceived compatibility with the communicator, and his perceived similarity significantly increase the communicator's ability to influence him. Results from Byrne (1961) and Berscheid (1966) suggest that perceived similarity on relevant, important issues facilitates influence more than similarity on irrelevant or less important issues.

Involvement

The influence recipient's involvement in the influence process can be manipulated by using issues of different intrinsic importance to the recipient, by varying the consequences or personal significance of the recipient's opinion, and by varying the amount of physical or psychological effort required by the process. Unfortunately, the effects of involvement on interpersonal influence have been investigated in very few studies. Involvement is usually held at a moderately high level across conditions by the intrinsic importance of current social and political issues. However, some evidence suggests the effects of these three sources of involvement on opinion change.

Zimbardo (1960) mentioned an unpublished study by Brehm and Lipsher in which they manipulated involvement using issues which varied in the degree to which subjects were concerned with them. They found that the amount of opinion change in the direction of the communicator was greater for issues of high concern than for the issue of low concern [pp. 91-92].

Bergin's (1962) results indicate that the theoretical model of opinion change presented here applies to issues of considerable personal importance, that is, self-conceptions of masculinity-femininity.

Zimbardo (1960) studied the effects of involvement by varying the consequences of subjects' opinions. He asked coeds to read a short case history of a juvenile delinquent and to give their opinion of the locus of blame for the youth's crimes. Then they were exposed to an opinion discrepant from their own, ostensibly that of their friend with whom they had signed up for the experiment. After the exposure, they were asked to make a "fresh" evaluation of the problem. Derogation was controlled by the friendship pairs and by a precommunication task in which the friend was established as an expert in judging juvenile delinquents from photographs. Communication discrepancy was set at high and low values. High involvement was induced by telling the coeds that their opinions revealed their personalities and social values. In the low-involvement condition coeds were told that "although they should read the case study carefully, they should not expect too much from it [p. 88]." It was too short and unrepresentative, and previous results had shown that their reactions would reveal nothing about their personalities or social values. Results were significantly influenced by both discrepancy and involvement. Opinion change was greater with large discrepancy than with small discrepancy and with high involvement than with low involvement. Interaction between the two main effects was not statistically significant.

Cohen (1959) manipulated involvement by varying the subjects' perceptions of ef-
fort necessary to understand a persuasive communication. Thirty-six undergraduates read a statement arguing that placing juvenile delinquents in foster homes would decrease delinquency. Three weeks earlier, and immediately after reading the statement, the students filled out an opinion questionnaire containing the target question. High involvement was induced for one-half of the students by telling them that the communication was difficult and required much effort to understand. The other students were told that the passage was relatively simple and easy to understand. The students were also classified into high and low groups according to the discrepancy of their initial opinion from the advocated opinion. Cohen found a significant interaction between effort and discrepancy: in the high-effort condition, students with high initial discrepancy changed their opinions more than students with low initial discrepancy; in the low-effort condition, students with low initial discrepancy changed their opinions more than those with high initial discrepancy. Overall, high-discrepancy students changed more than low-discrepancy students.

These studies indicate that opinion change is facilitated when influence recipients are highly involved in the influence process. All three modes of involvement are effective in enhancing opinion change. In addition, there is evidence from studies not directly dealing with interpersonal influence that effort, unjustified by reward, greatly enhances cognitive change (Aronson, 1961; Aronson & Mills, 1959).

Conclusion

The research reviewed here shows the importance of perceived expertise, trustworthiness, attractiveness, and involvement in interpersonal persuasion. These variables control the means of reducing dissonance raised by a discrepant communication. At high values they deter dissonance reduction by discrediting the communicator and devaluing the issue and thus enhance opinion and attitude change. These results suggest that interpersonal persuasion can be conceptualized as a two-phase process. First, communicator credi-

bility and attractiveness and audience involvement are enhanced to increase the probability of success of later influence attempts; second, statements intended to bring about the desired opinion and attitude changes are communicated. Let us now identify those processes and techniques in counseling which implement the first phase of the influence process.

OPINION-CHANGE VARIABLES IN COUNSELING

Expertness

Counseling has expended considerable effort to provide the practitioner with objective indexes of his specialized training, knowledge, and expertise. Diplomas, state certifications, and certificates of membership in professional organizations adorn the walls of the counselor's office. Shelves filled with professional books and periodicals and stacks of confidential letters, announcements, and folders on desks attest to the counselor's expertise. Raven (1965), Schofield (1964, p. 107), and Frank (1963, p. 129) have pointed out the importance of these evidences of "expert power" in interpersonal persuasion.

Less obvious, but perhaps more important, are the evidences of expertise in the counselor's behavior. Most counselors pay considerable attention to structuring the interview. They point out the roles and requirements of the client and the counselor in the interview, the sequences of the process, and events likely to occur as they work toward problem solution. Such structuring, whether explicit or implicit, gives evidence of the counselor's expertise. Since the client must perceive that the counselor knows what he is doing, explicit structuring may be more effective than implicit structuring. There is some evidence that explicit structuring does enhance counseling effectiveness (Traux, 1966). Structuring also enhances the counselor's "informational influence" (Raven, 1965). The client is provided a "rational" framework to view his problem, the means of problem solution, and the importance of his efforts and further information. He is thus more able to guide his own efforts toward problem solution. Frank (1963, p. 146) has
suggested that the counselor's confidence in his therapeutic theory and procedure enhances his counseling effectiveness. Such confidence enhances the client's perception of the counselor's expertise.

**Trustworthiness**

A major contribution to the counselor's perceived trustworthiness is his socially sanctioned role as an extender of help, a source of assistance in problems of living, or what Raven (1965) has termed "legitimate influence." The client, in coming to the counselor, accepts this role. Professional organizations for counselors have established codes of ethics to insure that counselors keep the client's welfare uppermost in their day-to-day transactions (American Personnel & Guidance Association, 1961; American Psychological Association, 1959). Behaviorally, counselors communicate a sincere, deep interest in the client's welfare. Frank (1963) has suggested that, "The attitudes of the therapist that seem to contribute most to the patient's trust in him are a steady, deep interest, an optimistic outlook, and a dedication to the patient's welfare [p. 115]." As further evidence that he is trustworthy, that he has no selfish or devious motives, the counselor assures the client that any information the client may divulge or that the counselor may obtain is completely confidential. Thus, the counselor establishes the client's perception of his personal trustworthiness by paying close attention to the client's statements and other behavior, by communicating his concern for the client's welfare, by avoiding statements indicating exhibitionism or perverted curiosity, and by assuring confidentiality of all transactions.

**Attractiveness**

The counselor's attractiveness to the client depends heavily on the counselor's behavior in the interview. A counselor may have a reputation as likable and compatible among potential clients which is generated by satisfied clients. This reputation, however, is ultimately a function of interview performance.

In the interview, liking is directly engendered by the counselor's unconditional positive regard or nonpossessive warmth for the client. Truax and Carkhuff (1967, pp. 58–68) have defined unconditional positive regard as valuing and caring for the client as a separate person regardless of the "goodness" or "badness" of his behavior. While this counselor characteristic may be regarded as an attitude, Truax and Carkhuff have shown that it is a measurable attribute of counselor behavior. Such nonpossessive caring, valuing, or liking for the client can be expected to generate reciprocal liking for the therapist as has been shown by Byrne (1961) and Mills (1966). Attractiveness derived from similarity and compatibility is engendered by counselor accurate empathy or therapeutic understanding. Truax and Carkhuff (1967) see accurate empathy as involving "... both the therapist's sensitivity to current feelings and his verbal facility to communicate this understanding in a language attuned to the client's current feelings [p. 46]." They pointed out that the counselor's own experiences and feelings are a major source of his sensitivity and understanding. Thus, when the counselor communicates his understanding, he is communicating his similarity to the client. Even when the communication is largely derived from theoretical and pragmatic knowledge of human nature, such understanding would seem to enhance the client's perception of counselor similarity and compatibility. Another means of enhancing perceived similarity is counselor revelation of experiences, feelings, or problems similar to those revealed by the client. This technique is potentially very powerful because of its immediate and unambiguous communication of real similarity. Its use, however, requires considerable clinical skill in judging when such self-revelation will be perceived by the client as real similarity and not as a "slip from role" or exhibitionism.

**Involvement**

Client involvement in counseling is enhanced in a number of ways. Counseling often begins with relatively high involvement in that the topic of conversation is a problem in living which is personally
Interpersonal Influence in Counseling

troubling to the client. Obviously, such a topic is intrinsically important to the client. Often, however, the client's involvement in counseling needs to be carefully enhanced to increase the probability of "appropriate" client change rather than a "flight into health" or premature termination of counseling. Two counseling techniques which enhance client involvement are reconnaissance (Sullivan, 1954, pp. 59-93), or scanning and focusing (Sundberg & Tyler, 1962, p. 115), and problem elaboration (Kelly, 1955, pp. 937-975). Clients expend considerable effort in these counseling processes. These exploratory procedures also enhance the client's perception of the importance of his problems and the many aspects of his life affected by the problem behavior. In addition to enhancing involvement and interpersonal intimacy, these processes provide the counselor with diagnostic understanding of the problem necessary for directing later influence attempts.

One of the most important techniques for enhancing client involvement is reflection of feeling or accurate empathy. Truax and Carkhuff (1967) have compiled impressive evidence that high levels of therapist accurate empathy (as well as nonpossessive warmth and genuineness) are causally related to client depth of self-exploration. They have conceptualized self-exploration in terms of client statements concerning self-worth, emotionally tinged experience, perceptions of relationships with others, emotional turmoil, or "expressions of more specific feelings of anger, affection, etc. [p. 195]." Such self-revealment obviously requires much effort and enhances problem-area saliency and importance to the client. Reconnaissance, problem elaboration, exploration of feelings (accurate empathy), all enhance the client's involvement by requiring much effort on his part and by increasing the perceived importance of the problem. There is a strong interaction between the processes enhancing client involvement and those enhancing perceived counselor characteristics. The counselor's communication of therapeutic understanding, nonpossessive warmth, and genuineness and his smoothness and self-assurance in guiding the various processes enhance his perceived expertness, trustworthiness, and attractiveness, as well as client involvement.

**TWO-PHASE MODEL OF COUNSELING**

The thrust of this paper is that counseling for attitude and behavior change is best conceptualized as a two-phase interpersonal influence process. The counseling processes and techniques discussed increase (a) the counselor's influence power over the client by enhancing his perceived credibility (expertness and trustworthiness) and attractiveness (liking, similarity, and compatibility), and (b) the persuasibility of the client by enhancing his involvement in counseling. As a result of these processes and techniques, the probability of client change in reaction to counselor influence attempts is maximized; the probability of the client's use of other avenues of reducing aroused dissonance is minimized. In the second phase, the counselor makes maximum use of the influence power he has built to implement the desired changes in client cognitive framework and behavior. The exact techniques he uses will depend on his diagnosis of the problem, the facilities available, his own expertise, and his guiding theoretical model. He may use interpretation, suggestion, advice, urging, information, homework assignments, reinforcement, role playing, modeling, behavioral enactment and practice, and other techniques. This agrees with Carkhuff (1966) who has suggested a similar two-phase model of counseling in which, during the second phase, the counselor does "...whatever is necessary to enable the client to achieve his goals [p. 468]."

**REFERENCES**


(Beside the quote, another text:)


(Received September 14, 1967)